Thursday, May 30, 2019
Peirce, Virtuality, and Semiotic :: Pierce Virtual Virtuality Essays
Peirce, Virtuality, and Semiotic The adjective virtual, practically unheard-of a few years ago, has without a doubt become the number bingle buzzword of the nineteen-nineties. Virtual reality has become a catch phrase for the interactive multimedia technologies that have supplanted desktop publishing at the cutting acuteness of personal-computer graphics technology. The virtual communities which for years have flourished in comfortable obscurity on the Internet, have recently been thrust into the glare of publicity as commercial-grade gateways have opened up the net to the public, while virtual corporations have transformed the world of business.Yet the word virtual is nothing new although its ubiquitousness is new, as is perhaps its current meaning or meanings. In his admirable glossary of cyberterms, the philosopher Michael Heim defines virtual as A philosophical term meaning not in reality but just as if, and he notes that the term in this sense goes back to the thirteenth-ce ntury philosopher John Duns Scotus. (1) The word virtuality may have been first used to light upon interactive computer systems by Theodore Nelson (the inventor of the term hypertext), who proposed this definition, in 1980 (2) By the virtuality of a thing I mean the seeming of it, as distinct from its more than concrete reality, which may not be important. ... I use the term virtual in its traditional sense, an opposite of real. The reality of a characterization includes how the scenery was painted and where the actors were repositioned between shots, but who cares? The virtuality of a movie is what seems to be in it.While this may at first blush seem equal to Heims later definition, Nelsons definition is in fact somewhat more specific and represents a significant meaning shift from the traditional sense, as becomes clear when we pipeline it with the definition offered in 1991 by the media philosopher Paul Levinson. Paraphrasing Levinson slightly, we may say that he defines a v irtual X as what you get when the information structure of X is detached from its physical structure. (3) Levinsons examples include virtual - i.e. electronic - classrooms, libraries, and books, and these certainly do not have the run across and feel of actual classrooms, libraries, or books. As I have noted elsewhere, the two definitions coincide in the case of virtual reality - the information structure of reality as a whole includes its look and feel - but this is a coincidence the two definitions represent different concepts.
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